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Abstract In this paper, we investigate Nash equilibrium payoffs for nonzero-sum stochastic differential
games with reflection. We obtain an existence theorem and a characterization theorem of Nash equilibrium
payoffs for nonzero-sum stochastic differential games with nonlinear cost functionals defined by doubly
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we study Nash equilibrium payoffs for nonzero-sum stochastic differential games whose
cost functionals are defined by reflected backward stochastic differential equations (RBSDEs, for short).
Fleming and Souganidis [7] were the first in a rigorous way to study zero-sum stochastic differential
games. Since the pioneering work of Fleming and Souganidis [7], stochastic differential games have
been investigated by many authors. Recently, Buckdahn and Li [3] generalized the results of Fleming
and Souganidis [7] by using a Girsanov transformation argument and a backward stochastic differential
equation (BSDE, for short) approach. The reader interested in this topic can be referred to Buckdahn,
Cardaliaguet and Quincampoix [1], Buckdahn and Li [3], Fleming and Souganidis [7] and the references
therein.
El Karoui, Kapoudjian, Pardoux, Peng and Quenez [5] introduced RBSDEs. By virtue of RBSDEs
they gave a probabilistic representation for the solution of an obstacle problem for a nonlinear parabolic
partial differential equation. This kind of RBSDEs also has many applications in finance, stochastic
differential games and stochastic optimal control problem. In [6], El Karoui, Pardoux and Quenez showed
that the price of an American option corresponds to the solution of a RBSDE. Buckdahn and Li [4]
considered zero-sum stochastic differential games with reflection. Wu and Yu [12] studied one kind of
stochastic recursive optimal control problem with the obstacle constraint for the cost functional defined
by a RBSDE.
Buckdahn, Cardaliaguet and Rainer [2] studied Nash equilibrium payoffs for stochastic differential
games. Recently, Lin [9, 10] studied Nash equilibrium payoffs for stochastic differential games whose cost
functionals are defined by doubly controlled BSDEs. Lin [9, 10] generalizes the earlier result by Buckdahn,
Cardaliaguet and Rainer [2]. In [9, 10], the admissible control processes can depend on events occurring
before the beginning of the stochastic differential game, thus, the cost functionals are not necessarily
deterministic. Moreover, the cost functionals are defined with the help of BSDEs, and thus they are
nonlinear. The objective of this paper is to generalize the above results, i.e., investigate Nash equilibrium
payoffs for nonzero-sum stochastic differential games with reflection. However, different from the earlier
results by Buckdahn, Cardaliaguet and Rainer [2] and Lin [9, 10], we shall study Nash equilibrium payoffs
for stochastic differential games with the running cost functionals defined with the help of RBSDEs. For
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this, we first study the properties of the value functions of stochastic differential games with reflection. In
comparison with Buckdahn and Li [4], we shall study nonzero-sum stochastic differential games of the type
of strategy against strategy, while Buckdahn and Li [4] considered the games of the type strategy against
control. Combining the arguments in Buckdahn, Cardaliaguet and Quincampoix [1] and Buckdahn and
Li [4], we can get the results in Section 4. Then we investigate Nash equilibrium payoffs for stochastic
differential games with reflection. Our results generalizes the results in Lin [9] to the obstacle constraint
case. In Lin [9], the cost functionals of both players do not have any obstacle constraint, so our results in
Section 5 are more general. The proof of our results is mainly based on the techniques of mathematical
analysis and the properties of BSDEs with reflection. The presence of the obstacle constraint adds us
the difficulty of estimates and a supplementary complexity.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce some notations and present some
preliminary results concerning reflected backward stochastic differential equations, which we will need in
what follows. In Section 3, we introduce nonzero-sum stochastic differential games with reflection and
obtain the associated dynamic programming principle. In Section 4 we give a probabilistic interpretation
of systems of Isaacs equations with obstacle. In Section 5, we obtain the main results of this paper,
i.e., an existence theorem and a characterization theorem of Nash equilibrium payoffs for nonzero-sum
stochastic differential games with reflection. In Section 6, we give the proof of Theorem 5.5.
2 Preliminaries
The objective of this section is to recall some results about RBSDEs, which are useful in what follows.
Let B = {Bt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T } be a d−dimensional standard Brownian motion defined on a probability space
(Ω,F ,P). The filtration F = {Ft, 0 ≤ t ≤ T } is generated by B and augmented by all P−null sets, i.e.,
Ft = σ
{
Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ t
}
∨NP,
where NP is the set of all P−null sets. Let us introduce some spaces:
L2(Ω,FT ,P;R
n) =
{
ξ | ξ : Ω→ Rn is an FT -measurable random variable such that E[|ξ|
2] < +∞
}
,
S2(0, T ;R) =
{
ϕ | ϕ : Ω× [0, T ]→ R is a predictable process such that E[ sup
0≤t≤T
|ϕt|
2] < +∞
}
,
H2(0, T ;Rd) =
{
ϕ | ϕ : Ω× [0, T ]→ Rd is a predictable process such that E
∫ T
0
|ϕt|
2dt < +∞
}
.
We consider the following one barrier reflected BSDE with data (f, ξ, S):

Yt = ξ +
∫ T
t
f(s, Ys, Zs)ds+KT −Kt −
∫ T
t
ZsdBs,
Yt ≥ St, t ∈ [0, T ],
K0 = 0,
∫ T
0
(Yr − Sr)dKr = 0,
(2.1)
where {Kt} is an adapted, continuous and increasing process, f : Ω× [0, T ]×R× Rd → R and we make
the following assumptions:
(H2.1) f(·, 0, 0) ∈ H2(0, T ;R),
(H2.2) There exists some constant L > 0 such that for all y, y′ ∈ R and z, z′ ∈ Rd,
|f(t, y, z)− f(t, y′, z′)| ≤ L(|y − y′|+ |z − z′|),
(H2.3) {St}t∈[0,T ] is a continuous process such that {St}0≤t≤T ∈ S
2(0, T ;R).
The following the existence and uniqueness theorem for solutions of equation (2.1) was established in
[5].
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Lemma 2.1. Under the assumptions (H2.1)-(H2.3), if ξ ∈ L2(Ω,FT ,P;R) and ST ≤ ξ, then equation
(2.1) has a unique solution (Y, Z,K).
We refer to [5] and [12] for the following two estimates.
Lemma 2.2. Let the assumptions (H2.1)-(H2.3) hold and let (Y, Z,K) be the solution of the reflected
BSDE (2.1) with data (ξ, g, S). Then there exists a positive constant C such that
E[ sup
t≤s≤T
Y 2s +
∫ T
t
|Zs|
2 + |KT −Kt|
2
∣∣∣Ft] ≤ CE[ξ2 + (
∫ T
t
g(s, 0, 0)ds
)2
+ sup
t≤s≤T
S2s
∣∣∣Ft].
Lemma 2.3. We suppose that (ξ, g, S) and (ξ′, g′, S′) satisfy the assumptions (H2.1)-(H2.3). Let
(Y, Z,K) and (Y ′, Z ′,K ′) be the solutions of the reflected BSDEs (2.1) with data (ξ, g, S) and (ξ′, g′, S′),
respectively. We let
∆ξ = ξ − ξ′, ∆g = g − g′, ∆S = S − S′,
∆Y = Y − Y ′, ∆Z = Z − Z ′, ∆K = K −K ′.
Then there exists a constant C such that
E
[
sup
t≤s≤T
|∆Ys|
2 +
∫ T
t
|∆Zs|
2ds+ |∆KT −∆Kt|
2
∣∣∣Ft
]
≤ CE

|∆ξ|2 +
(∫ T
t
|∆g(s, Ys, Zs)|ds
)2 ∣∣∣Ft

+ C (E [ sup
t≤s≤T
|∆Ss|
2
∣∣∣Ft
])1/2
Ψ
1/2
t,T ,
where
Ψt,T = E

|ξ|2 +
(∫ T
t
|g(s, 0, 0)|ds
)2
+ sup
t≤s≤T
|Ss|
2
+|ξ′|2 +
(∫ T
t
|g′(s, 0, 0)|ds
)2
+ sup
t≤s≤T
|S′s|
2
∣∣∣Ft

 .
We also need the following lemma. For its proof, the interested reader can refer to [5] and [8] for more
details.
Lemma 2.4. Let us denote by (Y 1, Z1,K1) and (Y 2, Z2,K2) the solutions of BSDEs with data (f1, ξ1, S1)
and (f2, ξ2, S2), respectively. If ξ1, ξ2 ∈ L2(Ω,FT ,P;R), S1 and S2 satisfy (H2.3), and f1 and f2 satisfy
the assumptions (H2.1) and (H2.2), and the following holds
(i) ξ1 ≤ ξ2, P− a.s.,
(ii) f1(t, y2t , z
2
t ) ≤ f
2(t, y2t , z
2
t ), dtdP− a.e.,
(iii) S1 ≤ S2, P− a.s.
Then, we have Y 1t ≤ Y
2
t , a.s., for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Moreover, if
(iv) f1(t, y, z) ≤ f2(t, y, z), (t, y, z) ∈ [0, T ]× R× Rd, dtdP− a.e.,
(v) S1 = S2, P− a.s.
Then, K1t ≥ K
2
t , P− a.s., for all t ∈ [0, T ], and {K
1
t −K
2
t }t∈[0,T ] is a increasing process.
3 Nonzero-sum stochastic differential games with reflection and
associated dynamic programming principle
In what follows, we assume that U and V are two compact metric spaces. The space U is considered as
the control state space of the first player, and V as that of the second one. We denote the associated
sets of admissible controls by U and V , respectively. The set U is formed by all U -valued F-progressively
measurable processes, and V is the set of all V -valued F-progressively measurable processes.
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For given admissible controls u(·) ∈ U and v(·) ∈ V , let us consider the following control system: for
t ∈ [0, T ], 

dXt,x;u,vs = b(s,X
t,x;u,v
s , us, vs)ds+ σ(s,X
t,x;u,v
s , us, vs)dBs, s ∈ [t, T ],
X
t,x;u,v
t = x ∈ R
n,
(3.1)
where
b : [0, T ]× Rn × U × V → Rn, σ : [0, T ]× Rn × U × V → Rn×d.
We make the following assumptions:
(H3.1) For all x ∈ Rn, b(·, x, ·, ·) and σ(·, x, ·, ·) are continuous in (t, u, v).
(H3.2) There exists a positive constant L such that, for all t ∈ [0, T ], x, x′ ∈ Rn, u ∈ U, v ∈ V ,
|b(t, x, u, v)− b(t, x′, u, v)|+ |σ(t, x, u, v) − σ(t, x′, u, v)| ≤ L|x− x′|.
Under the above assumptions, for any u(·) ∈ U and v(·) ∈ V , the control system (3.1) has a unique strong
solution {Xt,x;u,vs , 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T }, and we also have the following standard estimates for solutions.
Lemma 3.1. For all p ≥ 2, there exists a positive constant Cp such that, for all t ∈ [0, T ], x, x
′ ∈ Rn,
u(·) ∈ U and v(·) ∈ V,
E
[
sup
t≤s≤T
|Xt,x;u,vs |
p
∣∣∣Ft
]
≤ Cp(1 + |x|
p), P− a.s.,
E
[
sup
t≤s≤T
|Xt,x;u,vs −X
t,x′;u,v
s |
p
∣∣∣Ft
]
≤ Cp|x− x
′|p, P− a.s.,
where the constant Cp only depends on p, the Lipschitz constant and the linear growth of b and σ.
For given admissible controls u(·) ∈ U and v(·) ∈ V , let us consider the following doubly controlled
RBSDEs: for j = 1, 2,

jY t,x;u,vs = Φj(X
t,x;u,v
T ) +
∫ T
s
fj(r,X
t,x;u,v
r ,
jY t,x;u,vr ,
jZt,x;u,vr , ur, vr)dr
+ jKt,x;u,vT −
jKt,x;u,vs −
∫ T
s
jZt,x;u,vr dBr, s ∈ [t, T ],
jY t,x;u,vs ≥ hj(s,X
t,x;u,v
s ), s ∈ [t, T ],
jK
t,x;u,v
t = 0,
∫ T
t
(jY t,x;u,vr − hj(r,X
t,x;u,v
r ))d
jKt,x;u,vr = 0,
(3.2)
where Xt,x;u,v is introduced in equation (3.1) and
Φj = Φj(x) : R
n → R, hj = hj(t, x) : [0, T ]× R
n → R,
fj = fj(t, x, y, z, u, v) : [0, T ]× R
n × R× Rd × U × V → R.
We make the following assumptions:
(H3.3) There exists a positive constant L such that, for all t ∈ [0, T ], x, x′ ∈ Rn, y, y′ ∈ R, z, z′ ∈ Rd,
u ∈ U and v ∈ V , Φj(x) ≥ hj(T, x) and
|fj(t, x, y, z, u, v)− fj(t, x
′, y′, z′, u, v)|+ |Φj(x)− Φj(x
′)|+ |hj(t, x)− hj(t, x
′)|
≤ L(|x− x′|+ |y − y′|+ |z − z′|).
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(H3.4) For all (x, y, z) ∈ Rn × R× Rd, fj(·, x, y, z, ·, ·) is continuous in (t, u, v), and there exist positive
constants C and α ≥ 12 such that, for all t, s ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ R
n,
|hj(t, x)− hj(s, x)| ≤ C|t− s|
α.
Under the assumption (H3.3), from [5] we know that equation (3.2) admits a unique solution. For
given control processes u(·) ∈ U and v(·) ∈ V , let us introduce now the associated cost functional for
player j, j = 1, 2,
Jj(t, x;u, v) :=
jY t,x;u,vs
∣∣
s=t
, (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn.
From Buckdahn and Li [4] we have the following estimates for solutions.
Proposition 3.2. Under the assumption (H3.1)-(H3.3), there exists a positive constant C such that, for
all t ∈ [0, T ], u(·) ∈ U and v(·) ∈ V, x, x′ ∈ Rn,
|jY t,x;u,vt | ≤ C(1 + |x|), P− a.s.,
|jY t,x;u,vt −
jY
t,x′;u,v
t | ≤ C|x − x
′|, P− a.s.
We now recall the definition of admissible controls and NAD strategies, which was introduced in [9].
Definition 3.3. The space Ut,T (resp., Vt,T ) of admissible controls for 1th player (resp., 2nd) on the in-
terval [t, T ] is defined as the space of all processes {ur}r∈[t,T ] (resp., {vr}r∈[t,T ]), which are F-progressively
measurable and take values in U (resp., V ).
Definition 3.4. A nonanticipative strategy with delay (NAD strategy) for 1th player is a measurable
mapping α : Vt,T → Ut,T , which satisfies the following properties:
1) α is a nonanticipative strategy, i.e., for every F-stopping time τ : Ω→ [t, T ], and for v1, v2 ∈ Vt,T
with v1 = v2 on [[t, τ ]], it holds α(v1) = α(v2) on [[t, τ ]]. (Recall that [[t, τ ]] = {(s, ω) ∈ [t, T ]×Ω, t ≤ s ≤
τ(ω)}).
2) α is a strategy with delay, i.e., for all v ∈ Vt,T , there exists an increasing sequence of stopping
times {Sn(v)}n≥1 with
i) t = S0(v) ≤ S1(v) ≤ · · · ≤ Sn(v) ≤ · · · ≤ T ,
ii)
⋃
n≥1{Sn(v) = T } = Ω, P-a.s.,
such that, for all n ≥ 1 and v, v′ ∈ Vt,T ,Γ ∈ Ft, it holds: if v = v′ on [[t, Sn−1(v)]]
⋂
([t, T ]× Γ), then
iii) Sl(v) = Sl(v
′), on Γ, 1 ≤ l ≤ n,
iv) α(v) = α(v′), on [[t, Sn(v)]]
⋂
([t, T ]× Γ).
We denote the set of all NAD strategies for 1th player for games over the time interval [t, T ] by At,T .
The set of all NAD strategies β : Ut,T → Vt,T for 2nd player for games over the time interval [t, T ] is
defined in a symmetrical way and we denote it by Bt,T .
NAD strategy allows us to put stochastic differential games under normal form. The following lemma
was established in [9].
Lemma 3.5. If (α, β) ∈ At,T × Bt,T , then there exists a unique couple of admissible control (u, v) ∈
Ut,T × Vt,T such that
α(v) = u, β(u) = v.
If (α, β) ∈ At,T × Bt,T , then from Lemma 3.5 we have a unique couple (u, v) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T such
that (α(v), β(u)) = (u, v). Then let us put Jj(t, x;α, β) = Jj(t, x;u, v). Therefore, let us define: for all
(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn,
Wj(t, x) := esssup
α∈At,T
essinf
β∈Bt,T
Jj(t, x;α, β),
and
Uj(t, x) := essinf
β∈Bt,T
esssup
α∈At,T
Jj(t, x;α, β).
Under the assumptions (H3.1)–(H3.3) we see that Wj(t, x) and Uj(t, x) are random variables. But using
the arguments in [1] and [10], we have the following proposition.
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Proposition 3.6. Under the assumptions (H3.1)–(H3.3), for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×Rn, the value functions
Wj(t, x) and Uj(t, x) are deterministic functions.
Let us now recall the definition of stochastic backward semigroups, which was first introduced by
Peng [11] to study stochastic optimal control problem. For a given initial condition (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn,
0 ≤ δ ≤ T − t, for admissible control processes u(·) ∈ Ut,t+δ and v(·) ∈ Vt,t+δ, and a real-valued random
variable η ∈ L2(Ω,Ft+δ,P;R) such that η ≥ hj(t+ δ,X
t,x;u,v
t+δ ), we define
jG
t,x;u,v
t,t+δ [η] :=
jY
t,x;u,v
t ,
where (jY
t,x;u,v
, jZ
t,x;u,v
, jK
t,x;u,v
) is the unique solution of the following reflected BSDE over the time
interval [t, t+ δ]:

jY
t,x;u,v
s = η +
∫ t+δ
s
fj(r,X
t,x;u,v
r ,
jY
t,x;u,v
r ,
jZ
t,x;u,v
r , ur, vr)dr
+ jK
t,x;u,v
t+δ −
jK
t,x;u,v
s −
∫ t+δ
s
jZ
t,x;u,v
r dBr, s ∈ [t, t+ δ],
jY
t,x;u,v
s ≥ hj(s,X
t,x;u,v
s ), s ∈ [t, t+ δ],
jK
t,x;u,v
t = 0,
∫ t+δ
t
(jY
t,x;u,v
r − hj(r,X
t,x;u,v
r ))d
jK
t,x;u,v
r = 0,
and Xt,x;u,v is the unique solution of equation (3.1).
For (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn, (u, v) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T , 0 ≤ δ ≤ T − t, j = 1, 2, we have
Jj(t, x;u, v) =
jG
t,x;u,v
t,T [Φj(X
t,x;u,v
T )] =
jG
t,x;u,v
t,t+δ [
jY
t,x;u,v
t+δ ]
= jGt,x;u,vt,t+δ [Jj(t+ δ,X
t,x;u,v
t+δ , u, v)].
Remark 3.7. We consider a special case of fj. If fj is independent of (y, z), then we have
Jj(t, x;u, v) =
jG
t,x;u,v
t,t+δ [η] = E
[
η +
∫ t+δ
t
fj(r,X
t,x;u,v
r , ur, vr)dr +
jK
t,x;u,v
t+δ
∣∣∣ Ft].
Proposition 3.8. Under the assumptions (H3.1)–(H3.3) we have the following dynamic programming
principle: for all 0 < δ ≤ T − t, x ∈ Rn,
Wj(t, x) = esssup
α∈At,t+δ
essinf
β∈Bt,t+δ
jG
t,x;α,β
t,t+δ [Wj(t+ δ,X
t,x;α,β
t+δ )],
and
Uj(t, x) = essinf
β∈Bt,t+δ
esssup
α∈At,t+δ
jG
t,x;α,β
t,t+δ [Uj(t+ δ,X
t,x;α,β
t+δ )].
The proof of the above proposition is similar to [1] and [10], we omit the proof here.
Proposition 3.9. Under the assumptions (H3.1)–(H3.4), there exists a positive constant C such that,
for all t, t′ ∈ [0, T ] and x, x′ ∈ Rn, we have
(i) Wj(t, x) is
1
2 -Ho¨lder continuous in t:
|Wj(t, x)−Wj(t
′, x)| ≤ C(1 + |x|)|t − t′|
1
2 ;
(ii) |Wj(t, x)−Wj(t, x′)| ≤ C|x− x′|.
The same properties hold true for the function Uj.
By means of the standard arguments and Proposition 3.8 we can easily get the above proposition.
The proof of the above proposition is omitted here.
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4 Probabilistic interpretation of systems of Isaacs equations with
obstacle
The objective of this section is to give a probabilistic interpretation of systems of Isaacs equations with
obstacle, and show that Wj and Uj introduced in Section 3, are the viscosity solutions of the following
Isaacs equations with obstacle, for (t, x) ∈ [0, T )× Rn,

min
{
Wj(t, x)− hj(t, x), −
∂
∂t
Wj(t, x) −H
−
j (t, x,Wj(t, x), DWj(t, x), D
2Wj(t, x))
}
= 0,
Wj(T, x) = Φj(x),
(4.1)
and 

min
{
Uj(t, x) − hj(t, x), −
∂
∂t
Uj(t, x)−H
+
j (t, x, Uj(t, x), DUj(t, x), D
2Uj(t, x))
}
= 0,
Uj(T, x) = Φj(x),
(4.2)
respectively, where
Hj(t, x, y, p, A, u, v) =
1
2
tr(σσT (t, x, u, v)A) + pT b(t, x, u, v) + fj(t, x, y, p
Tσ(t, x, u, v), u, v),
(t, x, y, p, u, v) ∈ [0, T ]×Rn×R×Rn×U ×V and A ∈ Sn (Sn denotes all the n×n symmetric matrices),
H−j (t, x, y, p, A) = sup
u∈U
inf
v∈V
Hj(t, x, y, p, A, u, v),
and
H+j (t, x, y, p, A) = inf
v∈V
sup
u∈U
Hj(t, x, y, p, A, u, v).
We denote by C3l,b([0, T ]× R
n) the set of real-valued functions which are continuously differentiable
up to the third order and whose derivatives of order from 1 to 3 are bounded. Let us recall the definition
of a viscosity solution of (4.1). The definition of a viscosity solution of (4.2) can be defined in a similar
way.
Definition 4.1. For fixed j = 1, 2, let wj ∈ C([0, T ]× Rn;R) be a function. It is called
(i) a viscosity subsolution of (4.1) if
wj(T, x) ≤ Φj(x), for all x ∈ R
n,
and if for all functions ϕ ∈ C3l,b([0, T ] × R
n), and (t, x) ∈ [0, T ) × Rn such that wj − ϕ attains a local
maximum at (t, x),
min
{
wj(t, x)− hj(t, x), −
∂
∂t
ϕ(t, x)−H−j (t, x, wj(t, x), Dϕ(t, x), D
2ϕ(t, x))
}
≤ 0,
(ii) a viscosity supersolution of (4.1) if
wj(T, x) ≥ Φj(x), for all x ∈ R
n,
and if for all functions ϕ ∈ C3l,b([0, T ] × R
n), and (t, x) ∈ [0, T ) × Rn such that wj − ϕ attains a local
minimum at (t, x),
min
{
wj(t, x)− hj(t, x), −
∂
∂t
ϕ(t, x)−H−j (t, x, wj(t, x), Dϕ(t, x), D
2ϕ(t, x))
}
≥ 0,
(iii) a viscosity solution of (4.1) if it is both a viscosity subsolution and a supersolution of (4.1).
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We adapt the methods in Buckdahn and Li [4] and Buckdahn, Cardaliaguet and Quincampoix [1] to
our framework. We can obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 4.2. Under the assumptions (H3.1)–(H3.3), the function Wj (resp., Uj) is a viscosity solution
of the system (4.1) (resp., (4.2)).
Let us now give a comparison theorem for the viscosity solution of (4.1) and (4.2). We first introduce
the following space:
Θ : =
{
ϕ ∈ C([0, T ]× Rn) : there exists a constant A > 0 such that
lim
|x|→∞
|ϕ(t, x)| exp{−A[log((|x|2 + 1)
1
2 )]2} = 0, uniformly in t ∈ [0, T ]
}
.
Theorem 4.3. Under the assumptions (H3.1)–(H3.3), if an upper semicontinuous function u1 ∈ Θ is a
viscosity subsolution of (4.1) (resp., (4.2)), and a lower semicontinuous function u2 ∈ Θ is a viscosity
supersolution of (4.1) (resp., (4.2)), then we have the following:
u1(t, x) ≤ u2(t, x), for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R
n.
By means of the arguments in Buckdahn and Li [4], we can give the proof of this theorem and the
proof is omitted here.
Remark 4.4. By Proposition 3.9 we see that Wj (resp., Uj) is a viscosity solution of linear growth.
Therefore, from the above theorem we know that Wj (resp., Uj) is the unique viscosity solution in Θ of
the system (4.1) (resp., (4.2)).
Isaacs condition:
For all (t, x, y, p, A, u, v) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn × R× Rn × Sn × U × V, j = 1, 2, we have
sup
u∈U
inf
v∈V
{1
2
tr(σσT (t, x, u, v)A) + pT b(t, x, u, v) + fj(t, x, y, p
Tσ(t, x, u, v), u, v)
}
= inf
v∈V
sup
u∈U
{1
2
tr(σσT (t, x, u, v)A) + pT b(t, x, u, v) + fj(t, x, y, p
Tσ(t, x, u, v), u, v)
}
.
(4.3)
Corollary 4.5. Let Isaacs condition (4.3) hold. Then we have, for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn,
(U1(t, x), U2(t, x)) = (W1(t, x),W2(t, x)).
In a symmetric way, for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn, we put
W j(t, x) := esssup
β∈Bt,T
essinf
α∈At,T
Jj(t, x;α, β),
and
U j(t, x) := essinf
α∈At,T
esssup
β∈Bt,T
Jj(t, x;α, β).
Using the arguments in [1] and [10], we have the following propositions.
Proposition 4.6. Under the assumptions (H3.1)–(H3.3), for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×Rn, the value functions
W j(t, x) and U j(t, x) are deterministic functions.
Proposition 4.7. Under the assumptions (H3.1)–(H3.3) we have the following dynamic programming
principle: for all 0 < δ ≤ T − t, x ∈ Rn,
W j(t, x) = esssup
β∈Bt,t+δ
essinf
α∈At,t+δ
jG
t,x;α,β
t,t+δ [W j(t+ δ,X
t,x;α,β
t+δ )],
and
U j(t, x) = essinf
α∈At,t+δ
esssup
β∈Bt,t+δ
jG
t,x;α,β
t,t+δ [U j(t+ δ,X
t,x;α,β
t+δ )].
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Isaacs condition:
For all (t, x, y, p, A, u, v) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn × R× Rn × Sn × U × V, j = 1, 2, we have
inf
u∈U
sup
v∈V
{1
2
tr(σσT (t, x, u, v)A) + pT b(t, x, u, v) + fj(t, x, y, p
Tσ(t, x, u, v), u, v)
}
= sup
v∈V
inf
u∈U
{1
2
tr(σσT (t, x, u, v)A) + pT b(t, x, u, v) + fj(t, x, y, p
Tσ(t, x, u, v), u, v)
}
.
(4.4)
By virtue of arguments in this section, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 4.8. Let Isaacs condition (4.4) hold. Then we have, for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn,
(U1(t, x), U2(t, x)) = (W 1(t, x),W 2(t, x)).
5 Nash equilibrium payoffs
The objective of this section is to obtain an existence of a Nash equilibrium payoff. For this, we consider
two zero-sum stochastic differential games associated with J1 and J2, i.e., the first player wants to
maximize J1 and the second player wants to minimize J1, while the first player wants to minimize J2 and
the second player wants to maximize J2.
In what follows, we redefine the following notations which are different from the above sections: for
(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn,
W1(t, x) := esssup
α∈At,T
essinf
β∈Bt,T
J1(t, x;α, β), W2(t, x) := esssup
β∈Bt,T
essinf
α∈At,T
J2(t, x;α, β)
We suppose that the following holds:
Isaacs condition A:
For all (t, x, y, p, A, u, v) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn × R× Rn × Sn × U × V, we have
sup
u∈U
inf
v∈V
{1
2
tr(σσT (t, x, u, v)A) + pT b(t, x, u, v) + f1(t, x, y, p
Tσ(t, x, u, v), u, v)
}
= inf
v∈V
sup
u∈U
{1
2
tr(σσT (t, x, u, v)A) + pT b(t, x, u, v) + f1(t, x, y, p
Tσ(t, x, u, v), u, v)
}
,
and
inf
u∈U
sup
v∈V
{1
2
tr(σσT (t, x, u, v)A) + pT b(t, x, u, v) + f2(t, x, y, p
Tσ(t, x, u, v), u, v)
}
= sup
v∈V
inf
u∈U
{1
2
tr(σσT (t, x, u, v)A) + pT b(t, x, u, v) + f2(t, x, y, p
Tσ(t, x, u, v), u, v)
}
.
Under the above condition, from the above section we see that: for (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn,
W1(t, x) = esssup
α∈At,T
essinf
β∈Bt,T
J1(t, x;α, β) = essinf
β∈Bt,T
esssup
α∈At,T
J1(t, x;α, β),
W2(t, x) = essinf
α∈At,T
esssup
β∈Bt,T
J2(t, x;α, β) = esssup
β∈Bt,T
essinf
α∈At,T
J2(t, x;α, β). (5.1)
In order to simplify arguments, let us also assume that the coefficients b, σ, fj ,Φj , fj and hj (j = 1, 2),
satisfy the assumptions (H3.1)–(H3.4) and are bounded.
We recall the definition of the Nash equilibrium payoff of nonzero-sum stochastic differential games,
which was introduced in Buckdahn, Cardaliaguet and Rainer [2] and Lin [9].
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Definition 5.1. A couple (e1, e2) ∈ R2 is called a Nash equilibrium payoff at the point (t, x) if for any
ε > 0, there exists (αε, βε) ∈ At,T × Bt,T such that, for all (α, β) ∈ At,T × Bt,T ,
J1(t, x;αε, βε) ≥ J1(t, x;α, βε)− ε, J2(t, x;αε, βε) ≥ J2(t, x;αε, β)− ε, P− a.s., (5.2)
and
|E[Jj(t, x;αε, βε)]− ej | ≤ ε, j = 1, 2.
From Lemma 3.5 it follows that the following lemma holds.
Lemma 5.2. For any ε > 0 and (αε, βε) ∈ At,T × Bt,T , (5.2) holds if and only if, for all (u, v) ∈
Ut,T × Vt,T ,
J1(t, x;αε, βε) ≥ J1(t, x;u, βε(u))− ε, J2(t, x;αε, βε) ≥ J2(t, x;αε(v), v)− ε, P− a.s. (5.3)
Before giving the main results in this sections we first introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 5.3. Let (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn and u ∈ Ut,T be arbitrarily fixed. Then,
(i) for all δ ∈ [0, T − t] and ε > 0, there exists an NAD strategy α ∈ At,T such that, for all v ∈ Vt,T ,
α(v) = u, on [t, t+ δ],
2Y
t,x;α(v),v
t+δ ≤ W2(t+ δ,X
t,x;α(v),v
t+δ ) + ε, P− a.s.,
(ii) for all δ ∈ [0, T − t] and ε > 0, there exists an NAD strategy α ∈ At,T such that, for all v ∈ Vt,T ,
α(v) = u, on [t, t+ δ],
1Y
t,x;α(v),v
t+δ ≥ W1(t+ δ,X
t,x;α(v),v
t+δ )− ε, P− a.s.
Using arguments similar to Lin [9] we can prove this lemma. The proof is omitted here. We also need
the following lemma, which can be established by standard arguments for SDEs.
Lemma 5.4. There exists a positive constant C such that, for all (u, v), (u′, v′) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T , and for
all Fr-stopping times S : Ω→ [t, T ] with X
t,x;u,v
S = X
t,x;u′,v′
S , P− a.s., it holds, for all real τ ∈ [0, T ],
E[ sup
0≤s≤τ
|Xt,x;u,v(S+s)∧T −X
t,x;u′,v′
(S+s)∧T |
2
∣∣∣Ft] ≤ Cτ, P− a.s.
Let us now give one of main results in this section: the characterization of Nash equilibrium payoffs
for nonzero-sum stochastic differential games with reflection. We postpone its proof to Section 6.
Theorem 5.5. Let Isaacs condition (4.3) hold and (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn. If for all ε > 0, there exist
uε ∈ Ut,T and vε ∈ Vt,T such that for all s ∈ [t, T ] and j = 1, 2,
P
(
jY t,x;u
ε,vε
s ≥Wj(s,X
t,x;uε,vε
s )− ε | Ft
)
≥ 1− ε, P− a.s., (5.4)
and
|E[Jj(t, x;u
ε, vε)]− ej | ≤ ε, (5.5)
then (e1, e2) ∈ R2 is a Nash equilibrium payoff at point (t, x).
Before giving the existence theorem of a Nash equilibrium payoff we first establish the following
proposition, which is crucial for the proof of the existence theorem of a Nash equilibrium payoff.
Proposition 5.6. Under the assumptions of Theorem 5.5, for all ε > 0, there exists (uε, vε) ∈ Ut,T ×Vt,T
independent of Ft such that, for all t ≤ s1 ≤ s2 ≤ T , j = 1, 2,
P
(
Wj(s1, X
t,x;uε,vε
s1 )− ε ≤
jGt,x;u
ε,vε
s1,s2 [Wj(s2, X
t,x;uε,vε
s2 )]
∣∣∣Ft) > 1− ε.
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Let us first give some preliminary result. Since the proof of the following lemma is similar to that in
[9], we omit here.
Lemma 5.7. For all ε > 0, all δ ∈ [0, T − t] and x ∈ Rn, there exists (uε, vε) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T independent
of Ft, such that, j = 1, 2,
Wj(t, x)− ε ≤
jG
t,x;uε,vε
t,t+δ [Wj(t+ δ,X
t,x;uε,vε
t+δ )], P− a.s.
Let us establish the following Lemma.
Lemma 5.8. Let n ≥ 1 and let us fix some partition t = t0 < t1 < · · · < tn = T of the interval [t, T ].
Then, for all ε > 0, there exists (uε, vε) ∈ Ut,T×Vt,T independent of Ft, such that, for all i = 0, · · · , n−1,
Wj(ti, X
t,x;uε,vε
ti )− ε ≤
jG
t,x;uε,vε
ti,ti+1 [Wj(ti+1, X
t,x;uε,vε
ti+1 )], P− a.s.
Proof. Let us prove this lemma by induction. By the above lemma, it is obvious for i = 0. We now
suppose that (uε, vε) independent of Ft, is constructed on the interval [t, ti) and we shall define it on
[ti, ti+1). From the above lemma it follows that, for all y ∈ Rn, there exists (uy, vy) ∈ Uti,T × Vti,T
independent of Ft, such that,
Wj(ti, y)−
ε
2
≤ jGti,y;u
y,vy
ti,ti+1 [Wj(ti+1, X
t,y;uy,vy
ti+1 )], P− a.s, j = 1, 2. (5.6)
For arbitrarily j = 1, 2, for all y, z ∈ Rn and s ∈ [ti, ti+1], we set
y1s =
jG
ti,y;u
y,vy
s,ti+1 [Wj(ti+1, X
ti,y;u
y,vy
ti+1 )], and y
2
s =
jG
ti,z;u
y,vy
s,ti+1 [Wj(ti+1, X
ti,z;u
y,vy
ti+1 )].
Then let us consider the following BSDEs:

y1s =Wj(ti+1, X
ti,y;u
y,vy
ti+1 ) +
∫ ti+1
s
fj(r,X
ti,y;u
y,vy
r , y
1
r , z
1
r , u
y
r , v
y
r )dr
+ 1Kti+1 −
1Ks −
∫ ti+1
s
z1rdBr,
y1s ≥ hj(s,X
ti,y;u
y,vy
s ), s ∈ [ti, ti+1],
1Kti = 0,
∫ ti+1
ti
(y1s − hj(s,X
ti,y;u
y,vy
s ))d
1Kr = 0,
and 

y2s =Wj(ti+1, X
ti,z;u
y,vy
ti+1 ) +
∫ ti+1
s
fj(r,X
ti,z;u
y,vy
r , y
2
r , z
2
r , u
y
r , v
y
r )dr
+ 2Kti+1 −
2Ks −
∫ ti+1
s
z2rdBr,
y2s ≥ hj(s,X
ti,z;u
y,vy
s ), s ∈ [ti, ti+1],
2Kti = 0,
∫ ti+1
ti
(y2s − hj(s,X
ti,z;u
y,vy
s ))d
2Ks = 0.
From the Lemmas 2.3 and 3.1 it follows that
|jGti,y;u
y,vy
ti,ti+1 [Wj(ti+1, X
t,y;uy,vy
ti+1 )]−
jG
ti,z;u
y,vy
ti,ti+1 [Wj(ti+1, X
ti,z;u
y,vy
ti+1 )]|
2
≤ CE[|Wj(ti+1, X
ti,y;u
y,vy
ti+1 )−Wj(ti+1, X
ti,z;u
y,vy
ti+1 )|
2
∣∣∣Fti ]
+CE[|
∫ ti+1
ti
fj(r,X
ti,y;u
y,vy
r , y
1
r , z
1
r , u
y
r , v
y
r )dr −
∫ ti+1
ti
fj(r,X
ti,z;u
y,vy
r , y
1
r , z
1
r , u
y
r , v
y
r )dr|
2
∣∣∣Fti ]
+CE[ sup
ti≤s≤ti+1
|hj(s,X
ti,y;u
y,vy
s )− hj(s,X
ti,z;u
y,vy
s )|
2
∣∣∣Fti ] 12
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≤ CE[|Xti,y;u
y,vy
ti+1 −X
ti,z;u
y,vy
ti+1 |
2
∣∣∣Fti ] + CE[
∫ ti+1
ti
|Xti,y;u
y,vy
r −X
ti,z;u
y,vy
r |
2dr
∣∣∣Fti ]
+CE[ sup
ti≤s≤ti+1
|Xti,y;u
y,vy
s −X
ti,z;u
y,vy
s |
2
∣∣∣Fti ] 12
≤ C|y − z|.
Combining the above inequality, Proposition 3.9 and (5.6) we see that
Wj(ti, z)− ε ≤ Wj(ti, y)− ε+ C|y − z|
1
2
≤ jGti,y;u
y,vy
ti,ti+1 [Wj(ti+1, X
t,y;uy,vy
ti+1 )]−
ε
2
+ C|y − z|
1
2
≤ jGt,z;u
y,vy
ti,ti+1 [Wj(ti+1, X
t,z;uy,vy
ti+1 )]−
ε
2
+ C|y − z|
1
2
≤ jGt,z;u
y,vy
ti,ti+1 [Wj(ti+1, X
t,z;uy,vy
ti+1 )], P− a.s.,
for C|y − z|
1
2 ≤
ε
2
.
Let {Oi}i≥1 ⊂ B(Rn) be a partition of Rn with diam(Oi) <
ε
2C
and let yl ∈ Ol. Then, for z ∈ Ol,
Wj(ti, z)− ε ≤
jG
t,z;uyl ,vyl
ti,ti+1 [Wj(ti+1, X
t,z;uyl ,vyl
ti+1 )], P− a.s. (5.7)
Let us put
uε =
∑
l≥1
1Ol(X
t,x;uε,vε)uyl , vε =
∑
l≥1
1Ol(X
t,x;uε,vε)vyl .
Then
jG
t,x;uε,vε
ti,ti+1 [Wj(ti+1, X
t,x;uε,vε
ti+1 )]
= jG
ti,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
;uε,vε
ti,ti+1 [
∑
l≥1
Wj(ti+1, X
ti,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
;uε,vε
ti+1 )1Ol(X
t,x;uε,vε
ti )]
= jG
ti,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
;uε,vε
ti,ti+1 [
∑
l≥1
Wj(ti+1, X
ti,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
;uyl ,vyl
ti+1 )1Ol(X
t,x;uε,vε
ti )]
=
∑
l≥1
jG
ti,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
;uyl ,vyl
ti,ti+1 [Wj(ti+1, X
ti,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
;uyl ,vyl
ti+1 )]1Ol(X
t,x;uε,vε
ti ),
which together with (5.7) yields
jG
t,x;uε,vε
ti,ti+1 [Wj(ti+1, X
t,x;uε,vε
ti+1 )] ≥
∑
l≥1
[Wj(ti, X
t,x;uyl ,vyl
ti )− ε]1Ol(X
t,x;uε,vε
ti )
=
∑
l≥1
Wj(ti, X
t,x;uyl ,vyl
ti )1Ol(X
t,x;uε,vε
ti )− ε =Wj(ti, X
t,x;uε,vε
ti )− ε,
from which we get the desired result.
Let us come to the proof of Proposition 5.6.
Proof. Let t = t0 < t1 < · · · < tn = T be a partition of [t, T ], and τ = sup
i
(ti+1 − ti). By Proposition 3.9
and Lemma 5.4 we see that, for all j = 1, 2, 0 ≤ k ≤ n, s ∈ [tk, tk+1) and (u, v) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T ,
E[|Wj(tk, X
t,x;u,v
tk )−Wj(s,X
t,x;u,v
s )|
2]
≤ 2E[|Wj(tk, X
t,x;u,v
tk )−Wj(s,X
t,x;u,v
tk )|
2]
+2E[|Wj(s,X
t,x;u,v
tk )−Wj(s,X
t,x;u,v
s )|
2]
≤ C|s− tk|(1 + E[|X
t,x;u,v
tk |
2]) + CE[|Xt,x;u,vtk −X
t,x;u,v
s |
2]
≤ Cτ. (5.8)
Here and after C represents a generic constant which may be different at different places.
We let (uε, vε) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T be defined as in Lemma 5.8 for ε = ε0, where ε0 > 0 will be specified
later. Then, for all i, 0 ≤ i ≤ n,
Wj(ti, X
t,x;uε,vε
ti )− ε0 ≤
jG
t,x;uε,vε
ti,ti+1 [Wj(ti+1, X
t,x;uε,vε
ti+1 )], P− a.s.
For t ≤ s1 ≤ s2 ≤ T , let us suppose, without loss of generality, that ti−1 ≤ s1 < ti and tk < s2 ≤ tk+1,
for some 1 ≤ i < k ≤ n− 1. Therefore, applying the Lemmas 2.3 and 2.4 we deduce that
jG
t,x;uε,vε
ti,tk+1
[Wj(tk+1, X
t,x;uε,vε
tk+1
)]
= jGt,x;u
ε,vε
ti,tk
[jGt,x;u
ε,vε
tk,tk+1
[Wj(tk+1, X
t,x;uε,vε
tk+1
)]]
≥ jGt,x;u
ε,vε
ti,tk [Wj(tk, X
t,x;uε,vε
tk )− ε0]
≥ jGt,x;u
ε,vε
ti,tk
[Wj(tk, X
t,x;uε,vε
tk
)]− Cε0
≥ · · · ≥ jGt,x;u
ε,vε
ti,ti+1 [Wj(ti+1, X
t,x;uε,vε
ti+1 )]− C(k − i)ε0
≥ Wj(ti, X
t,x;uε,vε
ti )− C(k − i+ 1)ε0,
from which we see that
jG
t,x;uε,vε
s1,tk+1
[Wj(tk+1, X
t,x;uε,vε
tk+1
)]
= jGt,x;u
ε,vε
s1,ti [
jG
t,x;uε,vε
ti,tk+1 [Wj(tk+1, X
t,x;uε,vε
tk+1 )]]
≥ jGt,x;u
ε,vε
s1,ti [Wj(ti, X
t,x;uε,vε
ti )− C(k − i+ 1)ε0]
≥ jGt,x;u
ε,vε
s1,ti [Wj(ti, X
t,x;uε,vε
ti )]− C(k − i+ 2)ε0
≥ jGt,x;u
ε,vε
s1,ti [Wj(ti, X
t,x;uε,vε
ti )]−
ε
2
,
where we put ε0 =
ε
2Cn
. We set
I1 =
jG
t,x;uε,vε
s1,tk+1 [Wj(tk+1, X
t,x;uε,vε
tk+1 )]−
jG
t,x;uε,vε
s1,ti [Wj(ti, X
t,x;uε,vε
ti )] +
ε
2
≥ 0,
I2 =
jGt,x;u
ε,vε
s1,s2 [Wj(s2, X
t,x;uε,vε
s2 )]−Wj(s1, X
t,x;uε,vε
s1 ) +
ε
2
. (5.9)
In what follows we shall prove the following:
E[|I1 − I2|
2] ≤ Cτ.
Let us put
ys =
jG
t,x;uε,vε
s,ti [Wj(ti, X
t,x;uε,vε
ti )], s ∈ [s1, ti].
Then we consider the associated BSDEs:

ys =Wj(ti, X
t,x;uε,vε
ti ) +
∫ ti
s
fj(r,X
t,x;uε,vε
r , yr, zr, u
ε
r, v
ε
r)dr + kti − ks −
∫ ti
s
zrdBr,
ys ≥ hj(s,X
t,x;uε,vε
s ), s ∈ [s1, ti],
ks1 = 0,
∫ ti
s1
(yr − hj(r,X
t,x;uε,vε
r ))dkr = 0,
and
y′s =Wj(s1, X
t,x;uε,vε
s1 ), s ∈ [s1, ti].
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Thus, applying Lemma 2.3 we conclude
|jGt,x;u
ε,vε
s1,ti [Wj(ti, X
t,x;uε,vε
ti )]−Wj(s1, X
t,x;uε,vε
s1 )|
2
≤ CE[|Wj(ti, X
t,x;uε,vε
ti )−Wj(s1, X
t,x;uε,vε
s1 )|
2|Fs1 ]
+CE[
∫ ti
s1
|fj(r,X
t,x;uε,vε
r , yr, zr, u
ε
r, v
ε
r)|
2|Fs1 ]
+CE[ sup
s1≤s≤ti
|hj(s,X
t,x;uε,vε
s )− hj(s1, X
t,x;uε,vε
s1 )|
2dr
∣∣∣Fs1 ] 12
≤ CE[|Wj(ti, X
t,x;uε,vε
ti )−Wj(s1, X
t,x;uε,vε
s1 )|
2|Fs1 ]
+C(ti − s1)
α + CE[ sup
s1≤s≤ti
|Xt,x;u
ε,vε
s −X
t,x;uε,vε
s1 |
2
∣∣∣Fs1 ] 12 ,
where we have used the assumptions (H3.3) and (H3.4) and the boundedness of fj . Since (u
ε, vε) ∈
Ut,T × Vt,T is independent of Ft we have
E[|jGt,x;u
ε,vε
s1,ti [Wj(ti, X
t,x;uε,vε
ti )]−Wj(s1, X
t,x;uε,vε
s1 )|
2|Ft]
≤ CE[|Wj(ti, X
t,x;uε,vε
ti )−Wj(s1, X
t,x;uε,vε
s1 )|
2] + C(ti − s1)
+CE[ sup
s1≤s≤ti
|Xt,x;u
ε,vε
s −X
t,x;uε,vε
s1 |
2
∣∣∣Ft] 12 .
By virtue of (5.8) we have
E[|jGt,x;u
ε,vε
s1,ti [Wj(ti, X
t,x;uε,vε
ti )]−Wj(s1, X
t,x;uε,vε
s1 )|
2] ≤ Cτ
1
2 . (5.10)
By a similar argument
E[|jGt,x;u
ε,vε
s2,tk+1 [Wj(tk+1, X
t,x;uε,vε
tk+1 )]−Wj(s2, X
t,x;uε,vε
s2 )|
2] ≤ Cτ
1
2 . (5.11)
For s ∈ [s1, s2] we put
y1s =
jG
t,x;uε,vε
s,tk+1 [Wj(tk+1, X
t,x;uε,vε
tk+1 )] =
jGt,x;u
ε,vε
s,s2 [
jG
t,x;uε,vε
s2,tk+1 [Wj(tk+1, X
t,x;uε,vε
tk+1 )]],
and
y2s =
jGt,x;u
ε,vε
s,s2 [Wj(s2, X
t,x;uε,vε
s2 )].
Let us consider the associated BSDEs:

y1s =
jG
t,x;uε,vε
s2,tk+1
[Wj(tk+1, X
t,x;uε,vε
tk+1
)] +
∫ s2
s
fj(r,X
t,x;uε,vε
r , y
1
r , z
1
r , u
ε
r, v
ε
r)dr
+k1s2 − k
1
s −
∫ s2
s
z1rdBr,
y1s ≥ hj(s,X
t,x;uε,vε
s ), s ∈ [s1, s2],
k1s1 = 0,
∫ s2
s1
(yr − hj(r,X
t,x;uε,vε
r ))dk
1
r = 0,
and 

y2s =Wj(s2, X
t,x;uε,vε
s2 ) +
∫ s2
s
fj(r,X
t,x;uε,vε
r , y
2
r , z
2
r , u
ε
r, v
ε
r)dr
+k2s2 − k
2
s −
∫ s2
s
z2rdBr,
y2s ≥ hj(s,X
t,x;uε,vε
s ), s ∈ [s1, s2],
k2s1 = 0,
∫ s2
s1
(yr − hj(r,X
t,x;uε,vε
r ))dk
2
r = 0.
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From the Lemmas 2.3 and 3.1 it follows that
|jGt,x;u
ε,vε
s1,tk+1 [Wj(tk+1, X
t,x;uε,vε
tk+1 )]−
jGt,x;u
ε,vε
s1,s2 [Wj(s2, X
t,x;uε,vε
s2 )]|
2
≤ CE[|jGt,x;u
ε,vε
s2,tk+1
[Wj(tk+1, X
t,x;uε,vε
tk+1
)]−Wj(s2, X
t,x;uε,vε
s2 )|
2
∣∣∣Fs1 ].
Hence, by (5.11) we see that
E[|jGt,x;u
ε,vε
s1,tk+1
[Wj(tk+1, X
t,x;uε,vε
tk+1
)]− jGt,x;u
ε,vε
s1,s2 [Wj(s2, X
t,x;uε,vε
s2 )]|
2] ≤ Cτ
1
2 .
The above inequality and (5.10) yield
E[|I1 − I2|
2] ≤ Cτ
1
2 .
Therefore,
P(I2 ≤ −
ε
2
) ≤ P(|I1 − I2| ≥
ε
2
) ≤
4E[|I1 − I2|2]
ε2
≤
4Cτ
1
2
ε2
≤ ε,
where we choose τ ≤
( ε3
4C
)2
, and by (5.9) we have
P
(
Wj(s1, X
t,x;uε,vε
s1 )− ε ≤
jGt,x;u
ε,vε
s1,s2 [Wj(s2, X
t,x;uε,vε
s2 )]
)
≥ 1− ε.
We also refer to the fact that since (uε, vε) is independent of Ft, the conditional probability P(·|Ft) of the
event
{
Wj(s1, X
t,x;uε,vε
s1 )−ε ≤
jGt,x;u
ε,vε
s1,s2 [Wj(s2, X
t,x;uε,vε
s2 )]
}
coincides with its probability. Indeed, also{
Wj(s1, X
t,x;uε,vε
s1 )− ε ≤
jGt,x;u
ε,vε
s1,s2 [Wj(s2, X
t,x;uε,vε
s2 )]
}
is independent of Ft The proof is complete.
Finally, we give another main result: the existence theorem of a Nash equilibrium payoff.
Theorem 5.9. Under the Isaacs condition A, for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×Rn, there exists a Nash equilibrium
payoff at (t, x).
Proof. By Theorem 5.5 we only have to prove that, for all ε > 0, there exists (uε, vε) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T
which satisfies (5.4) and (5.5) for s ∈ [t, T ], j = 1, 2. For ε > 0, let us consider (uε, vε) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T
given by Proposition 5.6, i.e., in particular, (uε, vε) is independent of Ft. Setting s1 = t and s2 =
T in Proposition 5.6, we get (5.4). Since (uε, vε) is independent of Ft, Jj(t, x;uε, vε), j = 1, 2, are
deterministic and
{
(J1(t, x;u
ε, vε), J2(t, x;u
ε, vε)), ε > 0
}
is a bounded sequence. Therefore, we can
choose an accumulation point of this sequence, as ε → 0. We denote this point by (e1, e2). From
Theorem 5.5 we see that (e1, e2) is a Nash equilibrium payoff at (t, x). The proof is complete.
6 Proof of Theorem 5.5
We now give the proof of Theorem 5.5.
Proof. For arbitrarily fixed ε > 0 and some ε0 > 0 (ε0 depends on ε and will be precise later), let us
assume that (uε0 , vε0) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T satisfies (5.4) and (5.5), i.e., for all s ∈ [t, T ] and j = 1, 2,
P
(
jY t,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
s ≥Wj(s,X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
s )− ε0 | Ft
)
≥ 1− ε0, P− a.s., (6.1)
and
|E[Jj(t, x;u
ε0 , vε0)]− ej| ≤ ε0. (6.2)
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We fix some partition: t = t0 ≤ t1 ≤ · · · ≤ tm = T of [t, T ] and put τ = sup
i
|ti − ti+1|. Let us apply
Lemma 5.3 to uε0 and t+ δ = t1, · · · , tm, successively. Then, for ε1 > 0 (ε1 depends on ε and is specified
later) we have the existence of NAD strategies αi ∈ At,T , i = 1, · · · ,m, such that, for all v ∈ Vt,T ,
αi(v) = u
ε0 , on [t, ti],
2Y
t,x;αi(v),v
ti ≤ W2(ti, X
t,x;αi(v),v
ti ) + ε1,P− a.s. (6.3)
For all v ∈ Vt,T , we set
Sv = inf
{
s ≥ t | λ({r ∈ [t, s] : vr 6= v
ε0
r }) > 0
}
,
tv = inf
{
ti ≥ S
v | i = 1, · · · ,m
}
∧ T.
Here λ denotes the Lebesgue measure on the real line R. We see that Sv and tv are stopping times such
that Sv ≤ tv ≤ Sv + τ .
We put
αε(v) =


uε0 , on [[t, tv]],
αi(v), on (ti, T ]× {tv = ti}, 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
Then, αε is an NAD strategy. It follows from (6.3) that
2Y
t,x;αε(v),v
tv =
m∑
i=1
2Y
t,x;αε(v),v
ti 1{tv=ti}
≤
m∑
i=1
W2(ti, X
t,x;αε(v),v
ti )1{tv=ti} + ε1
= W2(t
v, X
t,x;αε(v),v
tv ) + ε1, P− a.s. (6.4)
Let us show that, for all ε > 0 and v ∈ Vt,T ,
J2(t, x;αε(v), v) ≤ J2(t, x;u
ε0 , vε0) + ε, αε(v
ε0 ) = uε0 . (6.5)
Thanks to (6.4), from Lemmas 2.3 and 2.4 we see that there exists a positive constant C such that
J2(t, x, αε(v), v) =
2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [
2Y
t,x,αε(v),v
tv ]
≤ 2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [W2(t
v, X
t,x;αε(v),v
tv ) + ε1]
≤ 2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [W2(t
v, X
t,x;αε(v),v
tv )] + Cε1. (6.6)
Therefore, from Lemma 2.3
| 2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [W2(t
v, X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
tv )]−
2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [W2(t
v, X
t,x;αε(v),v
tv )]|
≤ CE[|W2(t
v, X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
tv )−W2(t
v, X
t,x;αε(v),v
tv )|
2
∣∣∣Ft] 12
≤ CE[|Xt,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
tv −X
t,x;αε(v),v
tv |
2
∣∣∣Ft] 12
≤ Cτ
1
2 , P− a.s.,
for the last two inequalities we have used Proposition 3.9 and Lemma 5.4. Then, (6.6) yields
J2(t, x, αε(v), v)
≤ 2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [W2(t
v, X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
tv )] + Cε1
+| 2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [W2(t
v, X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
tv )]−
2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [W2(t
v, X
t,x;αε(v),v
tv )]|
16
≤ 2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [W2(t
v, X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
tv )] + Cε1 + Cτ
1
2 .
Putting
Ωs =
{
2Y t,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
s ≥W2(s,X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
s )− ε0
}
, s ∈ [t, T ], (6.7)
we have
J2(t, x;αε(v), v)
≤ 2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [
m∑
i=1
W2(ti, X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
ti )1{tv=ti}] + Cε1 + Cτ
1
2
≤ 2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [
m∑
i=1
W2(ti, X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
ti )1{tv=ti}1Ωti ] + Cε1 + Cτ
1
2 + I, (6.8)
where
I = | 2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [
m∑
i=1
W2(ti, X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
ti )1{tv=ti}]−
2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [
m∑
i=1
W2(ti, X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
ti )1{tv=ti}1Ωti ]|.
Since Φ2, f2 and h2 are bounded, from Lemma 2.2 we conclude that W2 is bounded. Therefore,
I ≤ E[
m∑
i=1
|W2(ti, X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
ti )|
21{tv=ti}1Ωcti
∣∣∣Ft] 12
≤ C
m∑
i=1
P(Ωcti |Ft)
1
2 ≤ Cmε
1
2
0 , (6.9)
where we have used (6.1) for the latter estimate. From the Lemmas 2.3, 2.4 and (6.7) we have
2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [
m∑
i=1
W2(ti, X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
ti )1{tv=ti}1Ωti ]
≤ 2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [
m∑
i=1
(2Y t,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
ti + ε0)1{tv=ti}1Ωti ]
≤ 2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [
m∑
i=1
2Y
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
ti 1{tv=ti}1Ωti + ε0]
≤ 2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [
m∑
i=1
2Y
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
ti 1{tv=ti}1Ωti ] + Cε0,
and using the above arguments we also have
| 2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [
m∑
i=1
2Y
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
ti 1{tv=ti}1Ωti ]−
2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [
m∑
i=1
2Y
t,x;αε(v),v
ti 1{tv=ti}]| ≤ Cmε
1
2
0 .
Consequently,
2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [
m∑
i=1
W2(ti, X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
ti )1{tv=ti}1Ωti ]
≤ 2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [
2Y
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
tv ] + Cε0 + Cmε
1
2
0
≤ | 2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [
2Y
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
tv ]−
2G
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
t,tv [
2Y
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
tv ]|
+ 2Gt,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
t,tv [
2Y
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
tv ] + Cε0 + Cmε
1
2
0
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= | 2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [
2Y
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
tv ]−
2G
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
t,tv [
2Y
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
tv ]|
+J2(t, x;u
ε0 , vε0) + Cε0 + Cmε
1
2
0
≤ J2(t, x;u
ε0 , vε0) + Cε0 + Cmε
1
2
0 + Cτ
1
2 ,
where we have used the fact that
| 2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [
2Y
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
tv ]−
2G
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
t,tv [
2Y
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
tv ]| ≤ Cτ
1
2 .
Indeed, let us consider the following BSDE

ys =
2Y
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
tv +
∫ tv
s
f2(r,X
t,x;αε(v),v
r , yr, zr, αε(vr), vr)dr + ktv − ks −
∫ tv
s
zrdBr,
ys ≥ h2(s,X
t,x;αε(v),v
s ), s ∈ [t, tv],
kt = 0,
∫ tv
t
(yr − h2(r,X
t,x;αε(v),v
r ))dkr = 0,
which compared with

2Y t,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
s =
2Y
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
tv +
∫ tv
s
f2(r,X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
r ,
2Y t,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
r ,
2Zt,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
r , u
ε0
r , v
ε0
r )dr
+ 2Kt,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
tv −
2Kt,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
s −
∫ tv
s
2Zt,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
r dBr,
2Y t,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
s ≥ h2(s,X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
s ), s ∈ [t, t
v],
2K
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
t = 0,
∫ tv
t
(2Y t,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
r − h2(r,X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
r ))d
2Kt,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
r = 0,
Note that αε(v) = u
ε0 , on [[t, tv]], v = vε0 , on [[t, Sv]], and from Lemma 2.3 we obtain
| 2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [
2Y
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
tv ]−
2G
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
t,tv [
2Y
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
tv ]|
2
≤ CE[
∫ tv
t
|f2(r,X
t,x;αε(v),v
r , yr, zr, αε(v)r, vr)dr − f2(r,X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
r , yr, zr, u
ε0
r , v
ε0
r )|
2|Ft]
+CE[ sup
r∈[t,tv]
|h2(r,X
t,x;αε(v),v
r )− h2(r,X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
r )|
2|Ft]
1
2
= CE[
∫ tv
Sv
|f2(r,X
t,x;αε(v),v
r , yr, zr, αε(v)r, vr)dr − f2(r,X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
r , yr, zr, u
ε0
r , v
ε0
r )|
2|Ft]
+CE[ sup
r∈[Sv,tv ]
|Xt,x;αε(v),vr −X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
r |
2|Ft]
1
2
≤ CE[
∫ tv
Sv
1{vr 6=vε0r }|Ft] + Cτ
1
2 ≤ CE[tv − Sv|Ft] + Cτ
1
2 ≤ Cτ
1
2 ,
where we have used the boundedness of f2, b and σ. Consequently,
2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [
m∑
i=1
W2(ti, X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
ti )1{tv=ti}1Ωti ]
≤ Cτ
1
2 + J2(t, x;u
ε0 , vε0) + Cε0 + Cmε
1
2
0 ,
and thus, (6.8) and (6.9) yield
J2(t, x;αε(v), v) ≤ J2(t, x;u
ε0 , vε0) + Cε0 + Cmε
1
2
0 + Cε1 + Cτ
1
4 .
We can choose τ > 0, ε0 > 0, and ε1 > 0 such that Cε0 + Cmε
1
2
0 + Cε1 + Cτ
1
4 ≤ ε and ε0 < ε. Thus,
J2(t, x;αε(v), v) ≤ J2(t, x;u
ε0 , vε0) + ε, v ∈ Vt,T .
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Using a symmetric argument we can construct βε ∈ Bt,T such that, for all u ∈ Ut,T ,
J1(t, x;u, βε(u)) ≤ J1(t, x;u
ε0 , vε0) + ε, βε(u
ε0) = vε0 . (6.10)
Finally, from (6.5), (6.10), (6.2) and Lemma 5.2 it follows that (αε, βε) satisfies Definition 5.1. Hence,
(e1, e2) is a Nash equilibrium payoff.
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